We study a dynamic market setting where an intermediary interacts with an unknown large sequence of agents that can be either sellers or buyers: their identities, as well as the sequence length n, are decided in an adversarial, online way. Each agent is interested in trading a single item, and all items in the market are identical. The intermediary has some prior, incomplete knowledge of the agents' values for the items: all seller values are independently drawn from the same distribution F S , and all buyer values from F B . The two distributions may differ, and we make standard regularity assumptions, namely that F B is MHR and F S is log-concave.
Introduction
The design and analysis of electronic markets is of central importance in algorithmic game theory. Of particular interest are trading settings, where multiple parties such as buyers, sellers, and intermediaries exchange goods and money. Typical examples are markets for trading stocks, commodities, and derivatives: sellers and buyers where each one trades a single item and one intermediary for facilitating the transactions. However, the well-understood cases are comparatively quite modest. The very special case of one seller, and one buyer was thoroughly studied by Myerson and Satterthwaite [27] in their seminal paper; they provided a beautiful characterization of many significant properties a mechanism might have, along with an impossibility theorem showing that it cannot possess them all. The paper also dealt with the case where a broker provides assistance by making two potential trades, one with each agent, while also trying to maximize his profit. This was extended in [16] to multiple sellers and buyers that are all immediately present in an offline manner.
Our work considers a similar setting, but with a key difference: the buyers and sellers appear one-by-one, in a dynamic way. It is natural to study this question in the incomplete information setting in which the intermediary, whose objective is to maximize either profit or welfare, does not know the sequence of buyers and sellers in advance. The framework that we employ to study the question is the standard worst-case analysis of online algorithms whose goal is to do as well as possible in the face of a powerful adversary which tries to embarrass them.
We are not the first to apply techniques from online algorithms to quantify uncertainty in markets: the closest work to ours would be by Blum et al. [9] who consider buyers and sellers trading identical items. In their setting, motivated mostly from a financial standpoint, buyers and sellers arrived in an online manner, with their bids appearing to the trader and expiring after some time. The trader would have to match prospective buyers and sellers to facilitate trade. Among a plethora of interesting results, the trader's profit maximization problem was studied using competitive analysis and techniques from online weighted matchings. The key difference in our setting is that buyers and sellers do not overlap: whenever a seller appears, the intermediary has to decide whether or not to attempt to buy the item, without having a buyer ready to go. Instead, the intermediary stores the item to sell it at a later time. We believe this variation is able to capture "slower" markets, like online marketplaces similar to Amazon or AliExpress (or even regular retail stores), where uncertainty stems from not knowing how large a stock of items to buy, in expectation of the buyers to come.
Our Results
Our aim is to study this dynamic market setting, where an intermediary faces a sequence of potential buyers and sellers in an online fashion. The goal of the intermediary is to maximize his profit, or society's welfare, by buying from the sellers and selling to buyers. We take a Bayesian approach to their utilities but use competitive analysis for their arrivals: the main difficulty stems from the unknown (and adversarially chosen) sequence of agents. Further particulars and notation is discussed in Section 2. All the online algorithms we design are posted price, which are simple, robust and strongly truthful.
First, in Section 4 we study the case of arbitrary sequences of buyers and sellers and show that the competitive ratio-the ratio of the optimal offline profit over the profit obtained by the online algorithm-is Θ( √ n), where n is the total number of buyers and sellers. We also study the social welfare objective, where the goal is to maximize the total utility of all participants, including the sellers, the buyers and the intermediary The competitive ratio here is Θ(log n). All these results are achieved via standard regularity assumptions on the distributions of the agent values (see Section 3), which we also prove to be necessary, by providing arbitrarily bad competitive ratios in the case they are dropped (Theorem 3).
To overcome the above pessimistic results, we next study in Section 5 the setting where both the online and offline algorithms have a limited stock, i.e. at no point in time can they hold more than K items. In this model, the competitive ratio is improved to Θ(K log n), asymptotically matching that of welfare. Finally, we also propose a way to restrict the input sequence, by introducing in Section 6 the notion of α-balanced streams, where at every prefix of the stream the ratio of the number of sellers to buyers has to be at least α. Under this condition we are able to bring down the competitive ratios for both objectives to constants. In particular, the online posted-price mechanism that we use for profit maximization, and which is derived by a fractional relaxation of the optimal offline profit, achieves an asymptotically optimal ratio of 1 + o (1) . A similar mechanism is 4-competitive for the welfare objective.
Prior Work
Our work is grounded on a string of fruitful research in mechanism design. The main topics that are close to our effort are bilateral trading, trading markets and sequential (online) auctions.
The first step in bilateral trading and mechanism design was made by Myerson and Satterthwaite [27] who proved their famous impossibility result, even for the case of one buyer and one seller. The case for profit maximization was extended to many buyers and sellers, each trading a single identical item, in [16] . Some of the assumptions in our model are based in these two works. The impossibility result in [27] , among other difficulties, slowly vanishes for larger markets as was shown by McAffee [26] . There is still active progress being made on this intriguing setting, concentrating on simple mechanisms that provide good approximations either to welfare while staying budget balanced and individually rational [10, 12] or to profit [28] . Other recent developments include a hardness result for computing optimal prices [18] and constant efficiency approximation with strong budget balance [15] .
Sequential auctions have also produced a collection of interesting results, either extending the ideas of simple approximate mechanisms instead of more complex, theoretically optimal ones or dealing with entirely new settings. Prominent examples that compare the revenue (or welfare) generated by simple, posted-price sequential auctions to the optimal, proving good approximations in certain cases, are [11] for single-item revenue, [14, 30] for matroid constraints (and some multi-dimensional settings) and [17] for combinatorial auctions. There have been many approaches that apply competitive (worst-case) analysis to mechanism design. The analysis of competitive auctions for digital goods is explored in [6, 8] where near optimal algorithms are developed using techniques inspired from no-regret learning. There is also a deep connection between secretary problems and online sequential auctions [21, 20, 4] . Hajiaghayi et al. utilized techniques such as prophet inequalities for unknown market size with distributional assumptions in [22] . A comprehensive exposition of online mechanism design by Parkes can be found in [29] .
There are also positive results in online auctions when the valuation distribution is unknown (but usually known to be restricted in some way, having bounded support or being monotone hazard-rate etc). Babaioff et al. explored the case of selling a single item to multiple i.i.d. buyers in [2] . The case of k items in a similar setting was studied in [3] , while the case of unlimited items (digital goods auctions) in [23] and [25] . Budget constraints where also introduced in [5] , where a procurement auction was the focus.
Preliminaries and Notation
The input is a finite string σ ∈ {S, B} * of buyers (B) and sellers (S). The online algorithm has no knowledge of σ(t), i.e. whether σ(t) = S or σ(t) = B, before step t. Also, it doesn't know the length n(σ) of σ. Denote n S (σ), n B (σ) the number of sellers and buyers, respectively, in σ, and let N S (σ), N B (σ) be the corresponding set of indices, i.e. N S (σ) = {t | σ(t) = S } and
In the above notation we will often drop the σ if it is clear which input stream we are referring to.
The values of the sellers are drawn i.i.d. from a probability distribution (with cdf) F S and these of buyers i.i.d. from a distribution F B , both supported over intervals of nonnegative reals. We denote the random variable of the value of the t-th agent with X t . We assume that distributions F S and F B are continuous, with bounded expectations µ S and µ B , and have (well-defined) density functions f S and f B , respectively. It will also be useful to denote by X S a random variable drawn from distribution F S , and similarly X B ∼ F B , and for any random variable Y and positive integer m use Y (m) to represent the maximum order statistic out of m i.i.d. draws from the same distribution as Y . We will also use the shortcut notation
We study posted-price online algorithms that upon seeing the identity of the t-th agent (whether she is a seller or a buyer), offer a price p t . We buy one unit of the item from sellers that accept our price (i.e. if σ(t) = S and X t ≤ p t ) and pay them that price, and we sell to buyers that accept our price (i.e. if σ(t) = B and X t ≥ p t ), given stock availability (see below), and collect from them that price. So, a price p t+1 can only depend on σ(1), . . . , σ(t + 1) and the result of the comparison X i ≤ p i in all previous steps i = 1, 2, . . . , t. Let K t denote the available stock at the beginning of the t-th step, i.e. K 1 = 0 and
Then, the set of sellers from whom we bought items during the algorithm's execution is I S = {t ∈ N S | X t ≤ p t } and the set of buyers we sold to is
Notice that these are random variables, depending on the actual realizations of the agent values X t . The total profit that the intermediary deploying an algorithm A makes throughout the execution on an input stream σ, is the amount he manages to collect from the buyers via successful sales, minus the amount he spent in order to maintain stock availability from the sellers, that is
The social welfare of algorithm A is the sum of valuations that all participants achieve throughout the entire execution. That is, a seller at position t of the stream has a value of X t if she keeps her item, or a value of p t if she sold the item to the intermediary; a buyer has a value of X t − p t if she managed to buy an item, since the item has a value of X t and he spent p t to buy it, or 0 otherwise. And the intermediary, has a value of R(A) plus the value of the items that he didn't manage to sell in the end and which are now left in his stock. Putting everything together and performing the occurring cancellations, this results in the welfare to be expressed simply as the sum of the values of the sellers that kept their items plus the sum of the values of the buyers that bought an item, i.e.
We use competitive analysis, the standard benchmark for online algorithms (see e.g. [13] ), in order to quantify the performance of an online algorithm A: we compare it to that of an unrealistic, offline optimal algorithm OPT has access to the entire stream σ in advance. Then, we say that A is ρ(n)-competitive with respect to welfare, if for any feasible input sequence of agents σ with length n and distributions F S , F B for the agent values, it is W(OPT, σ) ≤ ρ(n)·W(A, σ). Notice how we allow the competitive ratio ρ(n) to explicitly depend on the input's length, so that we can perform asymptotic analysis as W(OPT, σ) and n tend to infinity. It is common in competitive analysis to allow for an additional constant in the right hand side of the above expression, that does not depend in the input, and which intuitively can capture some initial configuration disadvantage of the online algorithm. We do that for the case of the profit objective, as this constant will have a very natural interpretation: you can think of it as the maximum amount of deficit on which an online algorithm can run at any point in time, since an adversary can always stop the execution at any time he wishes. Given that interpretation, it makes sense to allow for this constant to depend on seller distribution F S , since even when we face a single seller at the first step we expect to spend an amount that depends on the realization of her value. Thus, we will say that an online algorithm is ρ(n)-competitive with respect to welfare, if for any input sequence of agents σ and any probability priors F S , F B ,
(2)
Distributional Assumptions
Throughout most of the paper we will make some assumptions on the distributions F B , F S from which the buyer and seller values are drawn. In particular, we will assume that F B has monotone hazard rate (MHR), i.e. log(1 − F B (x)) is concave, and that F S is log-concave, i.e. log F S (x) is concave. For convenience, we will collectively refer to both the above constraints as regularity. These conditions are rather standard in the optimal auctions literature, and they encompass a large class of natural of distributions including e.g. exponential, uniform and normal ones. Notice that distributions that satisfy the above conditions also fulfil the regularity requirements introduced in the seminal paper Myerson and Satterthwaite [27] for the singleshot, one buyer and one seller setting of bilateral trade, namely that x +
are both increasing functions. Finally, we must mention that such regularity assumptions are necessary, in the sense that dropping them would result in arbitrarily bad lower bounds for the competitive ratios of our objectives, as it is demonstrated by Theorem 3.
The following two lemmas demonstrate some key properties of the regular distributions that will be very useful in our subsequent analysis: 
Theorem 1. For any random variable Y drawn from an MHR distribution with bounded expectation µ and standard deviation s,
1. Pr [Y ≥ y] ≥ 1 e for any y ≤ µ 2. Pr [Y ≥ y] < 1 e for any y > 2µ 3. E[Y (m) ] ≤ H m · µ,E Y 2 ≤ 2µ 2 , so s 2 = E Y 2 − µ 2 ≤ µ 2 .
Lemma 1.
For any distribution over [0, ∞) with log-concave cdf F and expectation µ,
for any x ≤ µ.
Proof. Fix some x ≤ µ and let c = x µ . Define the random variable Y = cX, where X is drawn from F , and let F Y be the cdf of Y . Since F is log-concave, ln F (t) is a concave function, and so from Jensen's inequality Finally, we prove the following property bounding the sum of maximum order statistics of a distribution, that holds for general (not necessarily regular) distributions and might be of independent interest:
Lemma 2. The expected average of the k-th highest out of m independent draws from a probability distribution with expectation µ and standard deviation s can be at most
denote the order statistics of m independent draws from a probability distribution with mean µ and standard deviation s. We want to prove that
General Setting
We start by studying the general setting where no additional assumptions are enforced on the structure of the input sequence. The adversary is free to arbitrarily choose the identities of the agents.
Welfare

Theorem 2. For regularly distributed agent values 1 , the online auction that posts to any seller and buyer the median of their distribution is O(ln n)-competitive with respect to welfare. This bound is tight.
Proof. We split the proof of the theorem in two more general lemmas below, corresponding to upper and lower bounds. Then, the upper bound for our case of regular distributions follows easily from Lemma 3 by using constants c 1 = c 2 = 2, and taking into consideration that, from Property 3 of Theorem 1, the ratio of the maximum order statistic for the MHR distribution
For the lower bound, it is enough to observe that this ratio is attained by an exponential distribution, which is MHR. • Post to all sellers price q = F
• Post to all buyers price p = F
1 As matter of fact, in the proof of Theorem 2 just regularity for the buyer values would suffice, i.e. FB being MHR.
Proof. Let A denote our online algorithm and OPT an offline algorithm with optimal expected welfare. Fix an input stream σ. Looking at (1), the maximum welfare that OPT can get from the sellers is at most E t∈N S X t = n s µ S , while from the buyers at most
, where κ is the maximum number of sellers that can be matched to distinct buyers that arrive after them 2 in σ: clearly, no mechanism can sell more than κ items. Bringing all together we have that
For the online algorithm now, from the sellers we get
and from the buyers at least
just by considering one of the κ-size matchings discussed before: if we manage to buy from one of these κ sellers, then we will definitely have stock availability for the matched buyer.
The upper bound in Lemma 3 cannot be improved:
Lemma 4. For any probability distribution F , even if the seller and buyer values are i.i.d. from F , the sequence SB n forces all posted-price online mechanisms to have a competitive ratio of Ω(r(n)), where r(n) = µ (n) /µ is the ratio of the n-maximum-order statistic of distribution F to its expectation.
Proof. Assume that the seller and buyer values are drawn i.i.d. from a distribution F . Let Y ∼ F denote a random variable following this distribution and denote
Fix an online algorithm A that posts price q to the seller and prices p ≡ p 1 , p 2 , . . . to the buyers. Notice that this sequence of buyer prices p cannot depend on the actual stream length n, since that is being selected adversarially. We overestimate A's expected welfare by assuming that it gets maximum welfare from the first seller, i.e. E[Y ] = µ, while at the same buys for sure the item from her so that it has stock availability to sell in the sequence of buyers. Then, from (1) its expected welfare is given by
where
First we show that we can without loss assume that the buyer prices are nonincreasing. Indeed, for a contradiction suppose that exists a time step t * such that α ≡ p t * < p t * +1 ≡ β.
Consider now the online mechanism that uses prices p , where p results from the original prices p if we flip the prices at steps t * , t * + 1, i.e. p t * = β, p t * +1 = α, and p t = p t for all t = t * , t * + 1. Then, the difference in the expected welfare between the two mechanisms is
which is nonnegative since α < β. There are two options for the prices p: either F (p t ) = 1 for all t, or k = min {t | F (p t ) < 1 } is a well-defined positive integer that does not depend on n, in which case define the constant c ≡ F (p k ) < 1. From (3), in the former case it is easy to see that W (p) = µ, while in the latter one
On the other hand, it is a well-know fact from the theory of prophet inequalities (see e.g. [24] ) that by using a price of
2 for all the buyers an offline mechanism can achieve a welfare of at least
2 from the buyers, given of course availability of stock. So, by setting e.g. a price equal to the median of F for the seller, the optimal offline welfare is at least
As the following theorem demonstrates, the regularity assumption on the agent values is necessary if we want to hope for non-trivial bounds. In particular, the lower bound in Lemma 4 can be made arbitrarily high: 
, where Γ (x) denotes the standard gamma function. So, as n grows large, the ratio in Lemma 4 becomes
Profit
Now we turn our attention to our other objective of interest, that of maximizing the expected profit of the intermediary. As it turns out, this objective has some additional challenges that we need to address. First, it is easy to see that for any ε ∈ (0, 1) no online algorithm can buy more than
items from the sellers in the first part of the stream, otherwise it will have to spend more than n ε 128 = ω (1) . This means that the maximum profit that an online algorithm can get, even if it manages to sell to the buyers all the items she bought from the sellers, is at most
Consider an offline algorithm that posts to seller and buyers the prices corresponding to the k . Then, the probability that the offline algorithm buys an item from a specific seller is F (q), resulting in the algorithm spending n 2 F (q)q in expectation. On the other hand, underestimate its expected income buy considering only selling to the i-th buyer the item that you got from the i-th seller. Then, the probability of achieving a successful transaction with a particular buyer is F (q)(1 − F (p)), resulting in an expected profit of at least
If we consider distributions supported over intervals that include 0, under standard regularity assumptions we can do a little better than the trivial lower bound of Theorem 4: • Post to all buyers price p = µ B .
Theorem 5. For agent values regularly distributed over intervals that include 0, the following online posted-price mechanism achieves a competitive ratio of O(n
Proof. Fix an input stream σ of length n. Let µ B and s B be the expectation and standard deviation of the buyer value distribution F B . As in the proof of Lemma 3, let κ denote the maximum number of sellers that can be matched to distinct buyers that arrive after them in σ. If µ (j:m) B denotes the expectation of the j-th largest out of m independent draws from F B , since no algorithm can make more than κ sales over its entire execution, the optimal offline profit is upper bounded by
where for the second inequality we have used Lemma 2 and for the last one we have used Property 4 from Theorem 1 and the obvious fact that κ ≤ n. For the analysis of the online mechanism now, the expected number of items that it gets from the first κ sellers is
e κ 1/2−ε . So, by considering the FIFO matching between these first κ sellers and their corresponding buyers (see Lemma 9) , the expected income of our algorithm is at least
where in the last step we deployed Property 1 of Theorem 1. So, it only remains to be shown that the online algorithm does not spend more than a constant amount. Indeed, our expected spending is at most
where for the first inequality we have used Lemma 1, taking into consideration that seller prices q i are decreasing and q 1 is below µ S . This is true because again from Lemma 1 for x = µ S we know that µ S ≤ eµ S F (µ S ), or equivalently F (µ S ) ≥ Proof. As in the lower bound proof of Theorem 4 we again deploy an input sequence σ = S n/2 B n/2 with n even. Let F (x) = x be the cdf of the uniform distribution over [0, 1] . This time we argue that no online algorithm can buy more than Ω( √ n) items from the sellers, in expectation. Indeed, let q i be the price that the online mechanism posts to the i-th seller. Then, the expected number of items m σ bought from the sellers is
i . By the convexity of the function t → t 2 and Jensen's inequality it must be that
so given that our deficit must be c σ = O( for the buyers and sellers, respectively, and by an analogous analysis to that of the proof of Theorem 4, we get that the expected offline profit is at least
Limited Stock
If one looks carefully at the lower bound proof for the profit in Theorem 6, it becomes clear that the source of difficulty for any online algorithm is essentially the fact that without knowledge of the future, you cannot afford to spend a super-constant amount of money into accumulating a large stock of items, without the guarantee that there will be enough demand from future buyers. In particular, it may seem that the offline algorithm has an unrealistic advantage of using a stock of infinite size. The natural way to mitigate this would be to introduce an upper bound K on the number of items that both the online and offline algorithms can store at any point in time. As it turns out, this has a dramatic improvement in the competitive ratio for the profit: • Post to all buyers price p = µ B .
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 5, but certain points need some special care. Let κ again be the maximum number of sellers that can be matched to distinct buyers that follow them, but this time under the added restriction of the K-size stock. This corresponds to the maximum matching with no "temporal" cut of size greater than K. We write "temporal" cut to mean any cut in the graph that separates the vertices (buyers and sellers) 1 . . . i from vertices i + 1 . . . n -that is, precisely the condition that we cannot match more than K sellers from an initial segment to buyers later in the sequence. Lemma 9 in the appendix demonstrates that such a κ-size matching can be computed not only offline, but also online using a FIFO queue of length K, adding sellers to the queue while it is not full and matching buyers greedily: we post prices to sellers, only if we have free space in our stock, i.e. when the matching queue is not full. We underestimate the online profit by considering only selling an item to the buyer that is matched to the seller from which we bought the item. Mimicking the analysis in the proof of Theorem 5 we can see that the expected number of items bought from the κ matched sellers is κF S (q) ≥ κ 
2 . Next, notice that whenever we make a successful sale, the contribution to profit is p − q ≥ µ B − µ B 2 = 1 2 µ B . Thus, the total expected gain in profit from sales is at least (4) will be replaced by β − α which is still nonnegative, and also the bad instance sequence of SB n does not use a stock of size more than 1. We try to overcome this obstacles by considering a different model of constrained streams in the following section.
Balanced Sequences
As we saw in Section 5, introducing a restriction in the size of available stock can improve the performance of our online algorithms with respect to profit. However, the bound is still superconstant. Thus, it is perhaps more reasonable to assume some knowledge of the ratio α between buyers and sellers in sequences the intermediary might face. This allows us finer control over the trade-off between high volume of trades and the hunt for greater order statistics.
In this section we analyse the competitive ratio for profit and welfare obtained by online algorithms on α-balanced sequences. For example, the sequence SBSSBSBB is 1-balanced, but SBBSSB is not. Similarly, SSSBSB is 2-balanced, while SSBSBSSSB isn't. Note that since n = n S α+1 α = n B (α + 1), we only need to know the number of buyers of a sequence. For convenience, we will denote it by m instead of n B , as it is used quite often.
Profit
We first work on profit, deriving bounds for a variety of online and offline mechanisms. Naturally, there are two types of offline mechanisms: adaptive and non-adaptive. The non-adaptive postedprice mechanism calculates all prices in advance based on the sequence of buyers and sellers, while the adaptive posted-price mechanism can alter the prices on the fly, depending on the outcomes of previous trades.
We show that there is a competitive online mechanism for α-balanced sequences. To do this, we compare the optimal adaptive and non-adaptive profit to the profit of a class of hypothetical mechanisms, called fractional mechanisms, which are allowed to buy fractional quantities of items: posting the price p would buy exactly F S (p) items or sell 1−F B (p) items. The advantage of using fractional mechanisms is that at any point we know the exact quantity of items in the hands of the intermediary instead of the expectation; an immediate consequence of this is that we know in advance whether there is enough quantity to sell, which implies that the adaptive and non-adaptive versions of the optimal fractional mechanism are identical.
We can now give an outline of the results in this section: For α-balanced sequences σ with m buyers and αm sellers, we establish the following relations of optimal profits:
the last of which will be our online algorithm. We begin by the fractional offline mechanism.
Theorem 8. The profit gained by the optimal fractional mechanism for the sequence
Proof. The profit and optimal prices can be calculated through the following optimization:
where q i and p i are the prices for buying and selling respectively. However, we can assume that the first constraint is tight, as all q i 's can be lowered until equality is achieved, without hurting the trades happening in the second half of the sequence. Remember, these are not in expectation, but rather, fractions. This constrained optimization can be reduced to finding stationary points of its Lagrange function
Taking its derivative with respect to price p i we get:
which has at most one solution for any given λ due to the distribution being regular. The treatment of q i 's is similar, leading to a unique solution as well. Thus, since p i = p and q i = q for all i we obtain the stated result.
For other sequences containing αm sellers and m buyers in a different order, we can use the following lemma to establish the middle part of inequality 5.
Lemma 5. For any α-balanced σ with m buyers, fractional(σ) ≤ fractional(S αm B m )
Proof. Let q i , p i be the prices set by the optimal fractional mechanism for sequence σ. These prices have to satisfy
, to ensure that the total quantity of items sold does not exceed the amount bought. Thus, the prices p i , q i represent a feasible solution to the optimization problem for the sequence S αm B m and by definition, their profit is at most as much as the optimal.
Theorem 9. For any sequence σ we have adaptive(σ) ≤ fractional(σ).
The intuition behind the proof of the theorem is that the optimal adaptive profit is bounded from above by the optimal fractional adaptive profit (since fractional mechanisms is a more general class of mechanisms); since in fractional mechanisms optimal adaptive and non-adaptive profits are the same, the theorem follows. For a more rigorous technical treatment, see Appendix A.
At this point, we have a clear model of the adversary's power: the fractional mechanism's revenue for sequence S αm B m , setting only two prices p, q for sellers and buyers. Could we do the same online? It seems likely. After all, long sequences of buyers and sellers seem to lead to a similar amount of trading on average by a mechanism setting the same prices.
Based on the previous discussion we propose the following online posted price algorithm:
• Use prices p, q given by the optimal fractional solution for S αm B m (see Theorem 8) .
This algorithm works without knowing the length of the sequence chosen by the adversary.
Lemma 6. Let A be the online algorithm defined by the optimal fractional offline prices of (6) .
Consider two α-balanced sequences σ 1 and σ 2 of equal length. We write σ 1 σ 2 whenever every prefix of σ 1 contains more sellers than the prefix of σ 2 having equal length. Then,
Proof. Assume the draws of σ 1 and σ 2 come from the same probability space, so that the i-th agent gets the same draw in both sequences. We will show that all trades (or at least as many) that happened in σ 2 will occur in σ 1 . Let i be the index of an arbitrary buyer that was matched to a seller in σ 2 and k the number of items in stock when he arrives in σ 1 . If k > 0, then we trade with him as we would do in σ 2 . If k = 0, we have already traded at least as many items as σ 2 at this point. To see this, note that since σ 1 σ 2 , at least as many items have been bought from the first i − 1 agents of σ 1 than from σ 2 and because k = 0, at least as many have been traded.
Although not all sequences are comparable (e.g. SSBBSB and SBSSBB), the sequence (S α B) m is the bottom element among all α-balanced sequences of length (α + 1)m. This is trivial, as any balanced sequence must have at least i (α+1)/(α) sellers for any prefix of length i and (S α B) m is tight for this bound.
To formalize our intuition of making the same number of trades in the long run, we reformulate our algorithm in the more familiar setting of random walks. Instead of considering agents separately, each "timestep" would be one sub-sequence S α B, giving m steps in total. Thus, we are interested in the random variables Z i , denoting the items in stock at the end of each step, starting with Z 0 = 0. Knowing the algorithm buys αmF S (q) items in expectation, the expected profit can be given by
which is the revenue of the expected number of trades minus the cost of the unsold items. 
with probability 1 2 −Z i+1 with probability
The crucial observation is that Y i behaves similar to Z i but has no barrier at 0. 
where we can set x = 2mα 2 log m to obtain the simpler form:
Lemma 8. Let r = max 2,
. The optimal value of Programme (6) Proof. Consider the value of Programme (6) that corresponds to the solution determined by the seller price q such that F S (q) = is decreasing with respect to x, as can be verified using that log(1 − F B (x)) is concave (see e.g. [7] 
Property 2 of Theorem 1 it must be that p * ≤ 2µ B , and thusp ≤ 2cµ B , resulting in
This means that if we use a solution with p = 2cµ B , for some c ≥ 1, the objective value of the Programme cannot exceed for any x > 0 and ce −c is a decreasing function for c ≥ 1. As a result of the above analysis we can conclude that the buyer price p of any optimal solution in Programme (6) must be such that p < 2µ B , or otherwise satisfy p ≤ 2 · 2 ln(4er) · µ B = 4 ln(4er)µ B . In any case, the desired upper bound for p in the theorem's statement holds.
Theorem 10.
Under our standard regularity assumptions, the proposed non-adaptive online mechanism is (1+o(α 3/2 r log r))-competitive for any balanced sequence, where r = max 2,
Proof. Plugging (11) into (7), we get:
Using Lemma 5, Theorem 9 and Theorem 8 we know that for every α-balanced sequence, the profit of our non-adaptive online algorithm is at least R((S α B) m ) and the optimal offline is at most that of the fractional on sequence S αm B m , i.e. αmF S (q)(p − q). Thus, the second term in (12) bounds the additive difference of the online and optimal offline profit, and its ratio with respect to the offline profit is upper bounded by
using m = n/(α + 1). 
Welfare
Welfare on balanced sequences also improves the competitive ratio of Theorem 2 to a constant. Intuitively, the reason is that the high volume of possible trades dampens the advantage the adversary has in obtaining higher order statistics from buyers. As before, the fact that all sellers start with some contribution to the welfare is also helpful.
Theorem 11. The online auction that posts to any seller and buyer the median of their distribution is 4-competitive.
Proof. The algorithm buys from half the sellers in expectation, so in the end the welfare obtained just from sellers is at least:
Following the proof of Lemma 3, let κ denote the size the matching between sellers and buyers. Since the input is α-balanced, we are guaranteed that every buyer is preceded by some distinct seller, meaning that κ is exactly N B . The welfare obtained from buyers is
Adding everything together, the online algorithm gets at least
On the other hand the optimal welfare is at most:
Notice that the above theorem holds without any regularity assumption on the agent value distributions. i. j M is matched in M on . This cannot happen due to the FIFO construction.
ii. j M is unmatched in M on . This cannot happen. If i were to enter the FIFO queue, it would be matched to j M (or an earlier available buyer) in M on . If i does not enter the FIFO queue this can only be because the queue was full. But if the queue was full, this means that K sellers before i were matched to buyers between i and j M (otherwise j M would be matched to one of them if M on ). So there is K edges going from sellers before i to buyers between i and j M in M on . So there is also K edges going that way in M, as they are identical on vertices before i. So there is K + 1 edges going from nodes before and including i to vertices after i in M, violating the K item limit.
Theorem 9. For any sequence σ we have adaptive(σ) ≤ fractional(σ).
Proof. Fix an adaptive mechanism and let Q i be the price posted to seller i andQ i be the probability of sale at price Q i . Since in an adaptive mechanism the price depends on the history, Q i andQ i are random variables. Similarly define P j andP j to be the price and probability of buying from buyer j. For the payments to sellers and from buyers we have:
Summing over all agents we get the expected profit:
where the last inequality follows from our regularity assumptions. Note that in the last inequality F −1 B (1 − E P j ) and F
−1
S (E Q i ) can be interpreted as prices set by the fractional mechanism, with E P j and E Q i the fractions of items bought and sold.
We have obtained the objective function of the optimization and it is left to a set of inequalities concerning the prices, to serve as the constraints. Observe that E Q i is the expected number of items bought from seller i, while E P j sold to buyer j. Let S t and B t be the sets of indices of sellers and buyers contained in the first t agents of the sequence.
Let Z t be the number of items exchanged with the agent encountered at step t. The number of items currently held by the intermediary at time t is t 1 Z i ≥ 0 by the no short selling assumption. Thus for all t:
Combining (13) and (14) gives us exactly the same optimization problem the optimal fractional mechanism would face for that sequence.
